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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington D.C. 20520

June 5, 1979

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TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/MS - Marshall Shulman
EUR - Robert L. Barry *RLB*

SUBJECT: Vienna Summit Preparations

Judging by Dobrynin's comments last evening to Zbig and Marshall and the third round of communique negotiations, the Soviets remain interested in "a friendly and constructive" Summit meeting. At the same time it becomes increasingly evident that they are unwilling to break new ground at the Summit and want to underline their differences with us on key Middle East and Southern Africa issues. They are signalling clearly that they don't want "surprises" on SALT II or SALT III and will resist breakthroughs on new verification measures or commitments to SALT III guidelines going beyond the negotiated joint statement on SALT III.

Dobrynin Meeting

The paper Dobrynin handed over last night is *with Marshall.*
~~Tab A.~~ Highlights are:

-- The Soviets are not ready to commit themselves in advance of a Summit to regularly scheduled consultations as we have proposed. They leave open the possibility that Brezhnev may agree to something along these lines but suggest that this would only be possible in the context of a favorable Summit outcome and progress on specific questions.

-- On SALT II they warn us away from raising a telemetry encryption ban, putting forward new proposals on Backfire or suggesting further cuts in delivery vehicles.

-- On SALT III they indicate that they will not be prepared to go beyond the most general statement of goals and stress their intention to insist on a communique marker tying SALT III to FBS. By implication, they make it clear they are not willing to entertain proposals for further deep cuts.

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-- On MBFR and ASAT they stress the differences in our positions while allowing for the possibility that progress could be made at the Summit.

-- On Non-Proliferation they reiterate their unwillingness to single out South Asia as an area of particular concern.

-- On CTB they indicate that they will not be willing to set aside the question of UK seismic stations.

-- On Southern African and the Middle East, they want to emphasize the differences between us. In particular this relates to our communique language on a role for the UN in the Middle East and peaceful settlement in Southern Africa.

-- On global issues, they continue to resist both discussion of the issues (LOS, WARC, Food, Aid to LDCs) or include references to them in the communique. In the communique draft sessions we have succeeded in retaining some of the language we suggested including the passage on efforts to deal with the problems faced by LDCs.

-- On Cuba they signal resistance to discussing issues such as submarine transfers or the MIG 23's in the context of the 1962 understanding and want to know precisely what we have on our minds.

-- On MFN they restate their position of principle (on linking trade and emigration) and say they want to avoid "surprises".

-- On Brezhnev's agenda they foreshadow emphasis on the Warsaw Pact CBM conference proposal and the Brezhnev proposal on cessation of production of nuclear weapons and reduction of stockpiles.

Other subjects discussed at the Brzezinski meeting were:

-- Tashkent Consulate. Dobrynin has no response to our proposal yet but will seek one.

-- Dissident Relatives. Dobrynin agreed to go back once more on the issue of letting Ginzburg's "adopted" son leave but expressed little confidence that this could happen as long as he was in the army

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Major Communique Issues:

-- Prevention of nuclear war agreement. We have still not accepted the Soviet language and Dobrynin may raise it. We are prepared to eventually accept a caveated reference but would like to get more from them on issues of concern to us first (e.g., Middle East, Afghanistan, etc.)

-- Consultations. Given the Soviet refusal to accept our language we may have to accept a more general formulation with the idea that it might be upgraded at the Summit.

-- SALT II. The Soviets are unwilling to accept our emphasis on verification. They particularly rejected our sentence on notification of all missile launches indicating that they did not feel that this could be negotiated before or at the Summit. You might urge them to give this more serious thought with the ratification debate in mind.

-- SALT III. They are unwilling to accept our language on qualitative and quantitative limitations without language implying that FBS must be taken into account.

-- Iran, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. They refused to accept any specific reference to these areas but say that they can accept US draft language on restraint in potential conflict situations. In press briefings we could cite this as a reference to Iran, Afghanistan, etc.

-- On Non-Proliferation they flatly refused to accept our language mentioning South Asia by name but will accept a passage calling for regional initiatives.

-- On the Middle East, they flatly refused our UN language and insisted on a phrase implying differing views.

-- On Southern Africa they refuse any reference to peaceful settlement and want a sentence implying different views.

-- On the grains agreement they rejected our paragraph calling for early renewal and expansion of the trade.

-- On world disarmament conference we have continued to stonewall and Dobrynin may raise the issue with you.

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We managed to accommodate most of the points which you raised in your marginal notes on the report of the last round of communique negotiations. ~~See attached text-Tab B.~~ *Marked has GxT.*

Points To Make With Dobrynin

- Share your desire for constructive Summit; disappointed that you see little possibility of using occasion to achieve more progress on key issues.
- Insistence on stressing different views on Southern Africa could cast a pall over the Summit.
- Urge reconsideration of position on UN role in Middle East.
- US proposal on regular consultations designed to provide new impetus to US-Soviet relations.
- Would like to strike a more positive stance on what could be accomplished in SALT III.
- Positive Soviet consideration of US verification proposals could be immensely helpful to SALT III ratification and prospects for SALT III.

Attachments: (*Marked has.*)

- Tab A - Paper ~~handed~~ over by Dobrynin
- Tab B - ~~Communique~~ from Second Round of Negotiations

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